000			02796nam a22004218i 4500
001			CR9781316227305
005			20250930143536.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			141020s2017||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781316227305 (ebook)
020			_z9781107106949 (hardback)
020			_z9781107514515 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050		4	_aJZ5665 _b.S43 2017
082	0	4	_a327.1/747 _223
100	1		_aSechser, Todd S., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aNuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy / _cTodd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2017.
300			_a1 online resource (344 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2017).
505	0		_aNuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.
520			_aAre nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.
650		0	_aNuclear arms control.
650		0	_aNuclear nonproliferation.
650		0	_aDiplomacy.
650		0	_aInternational relations. _960057
700	1		_aFuhrmann, Matthew, _d1980- _eauthor.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107106949
856	4	0	_uhttps://eresourcesptsl.ukm.remotexs.co/user/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305
907			_a.b16844981 _b2022-10-31 _c2020-12-22
942			_n0
998			_a1 _b2020-12-22 _cm _da _feng _genk _y0 _z.b16844981
999			_c651841 _d651841