000			03469cam a2200409 a 4500
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008			100812m20099999nju bi 001 0 eng
020			_a0691136807 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper)
020			_a9780691136806 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper)
020			_a0691136815 (v. 1. : pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a9780691136813 (v. 1. : pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a0691136823 (v. 2 : cased)
020			_a9780691136820 (v. 2 : cased) _cHarga Asal (RM306.85)
020			_a0691136831 (v. 2 : pbk.)
020			_a9780691136837 (v. 2 : pbk.)
039		9	_a201011110956 _bariff _c201010271652 _didah _c201010201628 _didah _c201008120930 _didah _y08-12-2010 _zidah
040			_aUKM
090			_aP107.S67
090			_aP107 _b.S67 2009
100	1		_aSoames, Scott
245	1	0	_aPhilosophical essays / _cScott Soames
260			_aPrinceton : _bPrinceton University Press, _c2009
300			_a2 v. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index
505	0		_av. 1. Natural language : what it means and how we use it: The origins of these essays -- Introduction -- Presupposition -- A projection problem for speaker presupposition -- Pt. 2. Language and linguistic competence -- Linguistics and psychology -- Semantics and psychology -- Semantics and semantic competence -- The necessity argument -- Truth, meaning, and understanding -- Truth and meaning in perspective -- Pt. 3. Semantics and pragmatics -- Naming and asserting -- The gap between meaning and assertion : why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean -- Drawing the line between meaning and implicaturem and relating both to assertion -- Pt. 4. Descriptions -- Incomplete definite descriptions -- Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction -- Why incomplete descriptions don't refute Russell's theory of descriptions -- Meaning and use : lessons for legal interpretation -- Interpreting legal texts : what is and what is not special about the law --
505	0		_av. 2. The philosophical significance of language-- Pt. 1 Reference, propositions, and propositional attitudes -- Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content -- Why propositions can't be sets of truth-supporting circumstances -- Belief and mental representation -- Attitudes and anaphora -- Pt. 2. Modality -- The modal argument: wide scope and rigidified descriptions -- The philosophical significance of the Kripkean necessary a posteriori -- Knowledge of manifest natural kinds -- Understanding assertion -- Ambitious two-dimensionalism -- Actually -- Pt. 3. Truth and vagueness -- What is a theory of truth? -- Understanding deflationism -- Higher-order vagueness for partially defined predicates -- The possibility of partial definition -- Pt. 4. . 4. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and following a rule -- Skepticism about meaning: indeterminancy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox -- Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox.
650		0	_aLanguage and languages _xPhilosophy
650		0	_aLinguistics _960271
650		0	_aSemantics
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0817/2008019492.html
907			_a.b14788056 _b2021-05-28 _c2019-11-12
942			_c01 _n0 _kP107.S67
914			_avtls003439982
991			_aFakulti Sains Sosial & Kemanusiaan
998			_at _b2010-12-08 _cm _da _feng _gnju _y0 _z.b14788056
999			_c465540 _d465540