Moral responsibility : the ways of scepticism / Carlos J. Moya

Introduction: scepticism about -- Moral responsibility (SMR) -- Determinism and alternative possibilities (SMR's premises A and B) -- Determinism (SMR's premise A) -- Does determinism preclude alternative possibilities? -- Alternative possibilities : conditional analyses -- The consequence argument and rule beta -- Defending incompatibilism -- Incompatibilism without transfer -- Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility (SMR's premise B) -- Frankfurt cases searching for alternatives -- Criticisms of the preceding strategy : the robustness -- Objection -- The dilemma defence -- Actual blockage cases -- Robustness, determinism, and the dilemma defence -- Rescuing the flicker strategy -- Robust (exempting) alternatives in Frankfurt cases -- Self-trapping cases -- Luther cases -- Moral responsibility and control (SMR's premise B) -- Ultimate control and determinism -- Classical compatibilism : actions, desires and the self -- Frankfurt's view of freedom of the will -- Frankfurt's view of moral responsibility -- Value-based accounts of control : Watson, Wolf -- Reasons-responsiveness and ownership : Fischer and Ravizza -- Indeterminism and moral responsibility (SMR's premise C) -- Alternative possibilities, ultimate control and indeterminism -- Kane's conception of free will -- Difficulties for Kane's libertarianism -- Overcoming scepticism : belief and moral responsibility -- Scepticism : diagnosis and outline of an anti-sceptical proposal -- Belief, control and responsibility -- Evaluative beliefs and moral responsibility -- Evaluative beliefs and alternative possibilities -- Indeterminism, belief and moral responsibility