Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court / edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-313) and index

Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn --'John Marshall has made his decision' : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers.